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2 Similarity 
Abstract 
Models of similarity have traditionally assumed that the similarity relation is symmetrical. 
However, when reversed, similarity statements frequently have diiferent properties from those of 
the original. Previous attempts to account for the asymmetry of similarity, have focussed only on 
literal comparisons, resulting in a tendency to underestimate the degree of asymmetry in non-literal 
comparisons (i.e^ similes). A model of similarity is proposed to account for the varying degrees of 
asymmetry found in all kinds of natural language comparisons. In this model, asymmetry is 
attributed to an imbalance in the salience of the shared attributes. Studies are reported which test 
key aspects of the model. The results appear to provide converging evidence for the claim that 
asymmetry of similarity is due at least in part to salience imbalance. 
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Salience, Similes, and the Asymmetry of Similarity 
In recent years, the research devoted to modeling similarity judgments (e.g., Carroll & Arabie, 
1980; Carroll & Wish, 1974; Gregson, 1975; Krantz & Tversky, 1975; Krumhansl, 1979; Nygren & 
Jones, 1977; Shepard, kilpatrick & Cunningham, 1975), and the research concerned with the nature 
and function of metaphor (e.g., Honeck & Hoffman, 1980; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Miall, 1982; 
O'Hare, 1981; Ortony, 1979b; Sacks, 1978) have for the most part progressed independently of one 
another. But, similarity and metaphor are not independent problems. Certainly, it is generally 
acknowledged that a satisfactory analysis of the nature of metaphor will have to invoke principles 
of similarity. However, what is less widely recognized is that a comprehensive theory of similarity 
will have to account for certain facts about metaphor. That this is true can be seen by considering 
the fact that similes (e.g., ballerinas are like butterflies) are metaphorical similarity statements, 
which means that a theory of similarity should help explain how and why such statements differ 
from other kinds of comparisons. A major purpose of the present research was to demonstrate the 
need to extend the purview of theories of similarity to the relevant but neglected domain of similes. 
In the course of doing so, some limitations of existing theories become apparent. The second main 
purpose of the work we describe was to test some key aspects of a model proposed by Ortony 
(1979a) which was developed in an attempt to overcome these limitations. 
Of the major contributors to theories of similarity, only Tversky (1977) even mentions the 
relationship between similarity and metaphor. In his model of similarity, the contrast model, the 
similarity between two entities, a and by is expressed as a linear combination of the measures of their 
common and distinctive features, as shown in Equation 1. 
5 ( a , b ) = 0 / (A PI B ) - otf (A - B ) - jS / (B - A ) ( l ) 
where 0, a, and /3 ^ 0. 
Here, 5 is a scale of similarity, A and B represent the feature sets of a and b respectively, and f is a 
measure of salience. S is a function of three disjoint sets: A OB which is the set of features common 
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to both entities, A-B which is the set of distinctive features of a (i.e., those in a not found in ¿>), and 
B-A which is the set of distinctive features of b. To avoid confusion in discussions about the order 
of the terms, we take "a is like bn to be the canonical form of (directional) similarity statements, 
and shall refer to the first term as the cz-term, and to the second term as the 6-term. Furthermore, 
we will use "attribute" in preference to "feature" so as to avoid any implication that we are 
referring to some kind of primitive or atomic constituent (e.g^ Katz & Fodor, 1963). Attributes can 
be thought of as schema constituents (see, for example, Rumelhart & Ortony, 1975), and so can 
sometimes be complex and/or relational in nature. Viewed in this way, attributes can be factual or 
mythical, known, believed, or merely suspected—they need not be true of the entity. 
The development of the contrast model (see also, Tversky & Gati, 1978; Tversky & Gati, 1982; 
Gati & Tversky, 1982) was motivated by evidence that judgments of similarity and dissimilarity 
can violate the metric axioms (see, Tversky & Krantz, 1970) upon which geometric models of 
similarity are based. Of particular concern to us is the fact that directional similarity judgments are 
not alwrays symmetric: Atypical members of categories tend to be judged as more similar to typical 
members than the other way around. For example, subjects rate North Korea as more similar to Red 
China than they do Red China to North Korea. Tversky explains such asymmetries by arguing that 
in directional similarity judgments, subjects tend to focus on the a-term more than on the ¿>-term 
(the focusing hypothesis). This is represented in the contrast model by assigning a larger value to a 
than to 0. 
The contrast model, however, is not without its problems—problems stemming from the 
measure of salience, f . "Salience" can be construed in at least two distinct ways. In 
multidimensional scaling, it refers to the extent to which an attribute is used to discriminate 
between entities (see, for example, Carroll & Chang, 1970). Construed in this way, the salience of 
an attribute has to do with how relevant that attribute is for making judgments in some domain. 
This seems to be the sense of "salience" employed in the contrast model, as is especially evident in 
Tversky's (1977) diagnosticity principle which maintains that the perceived similarity of pairs of 
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objects may change when the objects appear in different groups (i.e., when the set of objects being 
judged changes). According to Tversky, such changes in perceived similarity are due to changes in 
the diagnostic value of certain features, which implies that the salience of an attribute can change as 
a function of the "particular object set under study." We refer to this sense of "salience" as 
relevance. However, there is another sense of the term "salience" in which it refers, not to relevance, 
but to the prominence or importance of an attribute in a person's representation of an entity or 
category. The difference between relevance and salience can be illustrated by considering a domain 
like that of general anesthetics and sleep-inducing drugs. Within this category the attribute induces 
sleep has high salience for all members. But, for precisely this reason, it has little relevance to 
similarity or dissimilarity judgments between members because the members cannot be 
distinguished on the basis of this attribute. In this example, the relevance of a highly salient 
attribute is low. However, this is not always the case. To use an example from Tversky (1977), the 
attribute real (which for most objects has relatively low salience) can acquire considerable relevance 
for judgments in a domain containing both mythical and actual animals. So, relevance is a 
characteristic of attributes with respect to task and object domains rather than with respect to 
objects themselves, while salience is a characteristic of attributes with respect to objects themselves. 
Because we shall be concerned primarily with an unrestricted domain in which any two entities can 
be compared, we shall be concerned only with the salience of attributes, not with their relevance. 
The distinction between salience and relevance reveals a problem for the contrast model. Since 
the measure, / , is defined in the model as a function of attributes without regard to their origin, one 
has to assume that it is intended as an object-independent measure of attribute salience. Whereas 
this salience independence assumption is appropriate for what we are calling relevance, it is not 
appropriate for what we are calling salience. Several considerations lead to the conclusion that the 
contrast model assumes salience independence, one of which is that without this assumption, the 
model would be incomplete because it nowhere specifies a psychologically motivated principle for 
assigning a salience value to an attribute which has different values with respect to a and b. 
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Another reason why the contrast model appears to be committed to the salience independence 
assumption is that salience independence is a necessary consequence of feature additivity, a 
characteristic which, according to Tversky, is satisfied by the function, / (Tversky, 1977, p. 332). 
But, now consider some object x which is comprised of a set of attributes, and suppose one adds to 
that set some additional attributes so as to produce a new object x'. Feature additivity entails that 
/ (x ') > / (x). However, since x' is a new object relative to x, its increased salience can only be 
assured if the salience of the original attributes that constituted x remains the same in x' as in x. 
But this condition is in fact a salience independence condition. Furthermore, feature additivity and 
salience independence are incompatible with the implication of the minimality axiom that "the 
similarity between an object and itself is the same for all objects." (Tversky, 1977, p. 328). From 
the example just cited, it is clear if / (x ') > / (x ) then J (X x ') > six y x ). Tversky's rejection 
of this implication is certainly consistent with the salience independence assumption. 
If the independence assumption is embraced then the shared attributes (i.e^ the grounds) of a 
comparison must be equally salient for the a-term and the ¿-term. One reason we believe the 
assumption to be invalid is that people generally consider one particular order of the terms in a 
comparison to be more appropriate and meaningful than the other. As indicated earlier, Tversky 
(1977) noted that the entity referred to by the ¿-term is generally more prototypical than the one 
referred to by the c-term. While this observation is undoubtedly correct (particularly for literal 
comparisons where the terms are likely to refer to members of the same category) it is not explained 
by the contrast model. We do not consider the assertion (Tversky, 1977, p. 333) that in such cases 
the salience of the prototype, f(B)y is generally greater than the salience of the variant, f(A), to 
constitute a satisfactory explanation. 
We find it more appealing to explain such asymmetries as Gildea and Glucksberg (1983) have 
done, in terms of the fact that speakers generally adhere to the "given/new" contract (Clark & 
Haviland, 1977). In similes (and indeed in all similarity statements) the "given" entity is the topic 
of the comparison and therefore is in the a-position. The "new" information that is being 
communicated about the given entity is contained in the ¿-term in the sense that it is a subset of the 
¿-term's attributes. Presumably, to convey the new information, a speaker selects a ¿-term for 
which the attributes to be communicated are highly salient. For this reason the ¿-term is likely to 
be a good example of something possessing those attributes. For example, suppose a speaker w^ants to 
suggest that an insult can cut deeply and cause a great deal of pain, and chooses to do so by using a 
simile. If the speaker's communicative intention is to be realized, it will not be sufficient to select 
some arbitrary ¿-term whose referent happens to have the properties of being able to cut deeply and 
cause pain. These attributes need to have some special status for the ¿-term if they are to be 
identified by the hearer as the predicates to be applied to an insult. The best strategy for the speaker, 
therefore, is to identify something for which the attributes are very salient, as is the case with 
razor. Thus, although a sheet of paper can cut and cause pain, the statement an insult is like a sheet 
of paper is virtually incomprehensible. This is presumably because in the case of a sheet o f paper, 
cutting and causing pain are simply not salient enough, and the more salient properties of sheets of 
paper seem not to result in a coherent statement at all. This analysis not only explains why the 
more typical example is in the ¿-position, but it also seems to imply that the attributes to be 
predicated of the c-term are likely to be more salient writh respect to the ¿-term than with respect to 
the a-term. If this were not normally the case, there would be no point in making the statement of 
similarity in the first place. 
Apart from the theoretical reasons wre have just discussed, the results of a study by Verbrugge 
and McCarrell (1977) and of a pilot studied we conducted, also suggest that the independence 
assumption is probably invalid. In their study, Verbrugge and McCarrell (1977) had subjects 
generate terms whose referents possessed certain attributes provided by the experimenters. 
Unknown to the subjects, these attributes were the grounds of metaphors. Verbrugge and McCarrell 
found that on average, ¿-terms from the original metaphors were twice as likely to be elicited by 
the grounds as were a-terms. In a pilot study, we also examined the likelihood of evoking the terms 
of similes given the shared attributes. In our study subjects were given the grounds of similes of the 
form "a is like b" together with a version of the similes in wrhich one or other of the terms wras 
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replaced with a blank. Subjects were asked to supply the missing term so as to complete the 
metaphorical comparison. The data showed that subjects were significantly more likely to supply 
the original b-term (or something semantically close to it) than they were to supply the original a-
term. 
However, these studies yield only indirect evidence against salience equivalence (i.e., against 
the independence assumption). There could be other dimensions on which a- and ¿-terms differ (e.g., 
familiarity) that would also explain these results. A more direct test is needed, especially in light of 
our distinction between salience and relevance. Given this distinction, the problem with the 
contrast model can now be reexpressed in terms of alternative interpretations of the meaning of the 
measure, / . 
In the contrast model the measure, / , seems now to be best interpreted as a measure of 
relevance, whereas in the model proposed by Ortony (1979a) it was considered to be a measure of 
salience. This latter model, which we shall refer to as the imbalance model, was developed in an 
attempt to provide a better account of the asymmetry of judged similarity, particularly for the 
terms in similes. It should be noted that the imbalance model is in fact itself a contrast model. Our 
purpose in calling it the imbalance model is to highlight the difference in theoretical emphasis 
between it and Tversky's model. Although Tverskv (1977, p. 328) acknowledges that "The 
directionality and asymmetry of similarity relations are particularly noticeable in similes and 
metaphors," the account of metaphor that he provides lacks the specificity of the account of 
similarity provided by the contrast model. Furthermore, the contrast model appears to lack the 
theoretical machinery to predict greater asymmetry for metaphorical than for other kinds of 
comparisons. In the contrast model, asymmetries in judged similarity have to be accounted for in 
terms of the focusing hypothesis (i.e., a ^ (}). This is because in any similarity judgment 
(directional or nondirectional) the measure of the common features, / (A fl B), is independent of 
the order in which the two terms are presented. The contrast model also appears to predict that the 
perceived similarity of the terms in literal comparisons will generally be higher than of terms from 
9 Similarity 
similes. This is because, in general, one should expect the terms from literal comparisons to have 
more common attributes and fewer distinctive ones than the terms from similes. 
In the imbalance model, the measure of the shared attributes depends only on their salience for 
the second term (the ¿-term), as shown in Equation 2. 
s(ayb) = 6 f h ( A H B ) - a f (A - B ) - p f ( B - A) (2) 
where 0, a, and (i ^ 0. 
With this formulation, a literal similarity statement can be viewed as one in which the two 
concepts denoted by the terms are likely to share many attributes, at least some of which are of 
relatively high salience for both. For example, sermons are like lectures because both are oral 
addresses given to groups of people, etc., and these attributes are of relatively high salience for both 
sermons and lectures. Therefore, the measure f b (A fl B) should be high. A simile can be viewed 
as a similarity statement in which the shared attributes tend to be of high salience for the ¿-term 
but of relatively low salience for the a-term. Because / b (A fl B ) is determined by the salience of 
the shared attributes vis a vis the ¿-term, this measure should be relatively high compared with the 
level predicted by the contrast model. For example, inducing drowsiness is more salient with 
respect to sleeping pills than with respect to sermons. Thus, the contribution of the salience of that 
attribute to the salience of the intersection is maximized if it is based on the salience for sleeping 
pills. Finally, a statement such as sermons are like grape f ruits (for which no consistent 
interpretation can readily be agreed upon) is viewed as an anomalous similarity statement because 
there are no relatively high salient attributes of grape f ruits that are shared with sermons. In this 
case, the measure / b (A fl B ) should be low. The measure f b (A fl B) is also likely to be low 
when metaphorical similarity statements are reversed. This is because in such statements it is 
unusual for there to be high salient attributes of the ¿-term (i.e., the ¿-term after the reversal) that 
are shared with the a-term. In other words, similes cannot be reversed without radical changes in 
perceived similarity and/or meaningfulness because there is an inherent imbalance in the salience of 
the relevant attributes shared by the two terms. In general, high salience of ¿-attributes is viewed 
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as a necessary condition for a meaningful (i.e., a literal or metaphorical as opposed to an anomalous) 
similarity statement. However, a general consequence of the model is that the asymmetry of any 
similarity statement (metaphorical or literal) can be due to differences in the salience of (at least 
some of) the attributes in the intersection. This account is, of course, very different from that of the 
contrast model where the salience of the intersection does not change as a result of a reversal. 
The prediction of the imbalance model that the terms from similes will tend to be rated as 
highly similar seems to be at odds with the predictions of the contrast model. Proponents of the 
contrast model might attempt to deal with this problem by arguing that similes are understood by 
reinterpreting the feature space that contains the compared objects. For example, Tversky (1977, p. 
349) asserts that there is "a close tie between the assessment of similarity and the interpretation of 
metaphors. In judgments of similarity one assumes a particular feature space . . . and assesses the 
quality of the match . . . . In the interpretation of similes, one assumes a resemblance — and 
searches for an interpretation of the space that would maximize the quality of the match." We find 
this unsatisfactory primarily because, while mathematically possible, it is cognitively implausible. 
It presupposes a process in which subjects first must understand the comparison at least to a sufficient 
degree to permit them to determine whether or not it is metaphorical. Then, having made this 
determination, a reinterpretation of the feature space is undertaken, apparently for no other purpose 
than to enhance the perceived similarity—a goal which, incidentally, could be more simply achieved 
by setting both a and /3 to zero. Furthermore, those attempting to explain the interpretation of 
similes in terms of a special simile-specific mechanism have to worry about accusations of 
circularity. The invocation of such a mechanism appears to presuppose that the comparison has 
already been interpreted, at least to the degree that it can be classified as a simile rather than as a 
literal or anomalous comparison. Thus, while the imbalance model suggests that asymmetry of 
meaning and of perceived similarity have the same underlying cause, namely salience imbalance, 
the contrast model offers no viable account of semantic asymmetry and no motivated basis for 
engaging in mental gymnastics like feature space reinterpretation designed to maximize perceived 
similarity. It has to divorce the process of understanding a comparison from the related process of 
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judging the similarity of its terms. 
It would seem, then, that while both the contrast model and the imbalance model make 
similar predictions about literal and anomalous comparisons with respect to asymmetry, the 
imbalance model makes specific predictions about metaphorical comparisons that the contrast model 
does not. In particular, two main hypotheses can be derived from the imbalance model, but not 
from the contrast model: ( l ) the asymmetry hypothesis: Metaphorical similarity statements will 
show much greater asymmetry of similarity and meaningfulness than will either literal or 
anomalous similarity statements, and (2) the salience imbalance hypothesis: The salience of the 
attributes involved in metaphorical similarity statements will be much higher for the ¿-terms than 
for the the c-terms, whereas for other kinds of similarity statements this imbalance will be very 
much less pronounced. 
In order to test these hypotheses, three experiments and a validation study were conducted. 
Study 1 investigated the relationship between perceived similarity, type of similarity statement, and 
order of terms. The main purpose of this study was to test the asymmetry hypothesis. The purpose 
of Study 2 was primarily to norm a pool of items from which would be selected the items to be 
used in Studies 3 and 4. Study 3 itself employed the salience-related measures of applicability, 
characteristicness, and conceptual centrality to investigate both the asymmetry hypothesis and the 
salience imbalance hypothesis. Finally, Study 4 tested the salience imbalance hypothesis by asking 
subjects to identify the attribute of each concept involved in a similarity statement that contributed 
most to making a comparison between them understandable. Subjects then rated the distinctiveness 
of these attributes relative to the concepts from which they were derived. 
Study 1 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the asymmetry hypothesis with three types of 
similarity statements, literal comparisons, metaphorical comparisons, and anomalous comparisons. In 
the interests of brevity and clarity, we will henceforth refer to these three types of comparisons as 
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Literals. Similes, and Anomalies, respectively. In the experiment, subjects were presented with both 
orders of the terms and they selected the order that gave rise to the more "sensible" comparison. 
They then rated the similarity of the terms in the statements, and classified the statements as 
Similes, Literals, or Anomalies. It was predicted that Similes would exhibit larger differences in 
perceived similarity when the order of their terms is reversed than would Literals and Anomalies. 
In this and all subsequent experiments in which ratings of both orders of (especially) Similes 
were collected, the two orders were presented as a pair rather than randomly distributed throughout 
a list. This is because pilot studies had shown that when subjects are required to make similarity (or 
other) judgments about reversed Similes (e.g., a magnet is like a smile) they tend to spontaneously 
"re-reverse" them and end up making their judgments about the original order (a smile is like a 
magnet). This problem is significantly alleviated by having subjects make their judgments about the 
two orders when those orders are juxtaposed. 
Despite the fact that the context in which a comparison appears often determines whether or 
not it is a Simile, a Literal, or an Anomaly (e.g„ Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds & Antos, 1978), 
similarity statements were selected that were assumed to be readily classifiable by subjects without 
contextual support. The classification phase of this study was incorporated in order to evaluate the 
appropriateness of this assumption. 
Method 
Subjects and Materials. The subjects were 62 undergraduates who participated in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for an introductory psychology course. 
Eighteen Similes of the form "a is like ¿>" were used, and from them 18 Literals were 
constructed by replacing the a-term of each of the Similes with a new term that was literally 
related to the ¿-term in the original comparison. Finally, 18 Anomalies were constructed by 
randomly pairing terms from the Literals. Any obviously meaningful comparisons that resulted 
from this last procedure were discarded. These materials appear in Appendix A. 
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For each of the 54 comparisons, the original order of the two terms was reversed and this 
reversed order was paired with the original order to form a comparison pair. An example of a 
comparison pair would be the two comparisons an education is like a stair-way and a stairway is like 
an education. Two different randomized lists of the 54 comparison pairs were constructed. The 
position of each comparison in the pairs was counterbalanced. This was done systematically for each 
comparison type. A second, complementary version of each list was constructed in which the 
positions of the two comparisons in each pair were interchanged, resulting in a total of four lists. 
Procedure. Subjects were run in groups of from five to fifteen persons. Each subject 
performed both a Similarity Rating task and a Classi fication task. The order in which these tasks 
were performed was counterbalanced. In both tasks subjects saw a list involving a different 
randomized order of the items. For the Similarity Rating task, subjects were instructed to decide 
which of the two comparisons they thought seemed more "reasonable, sensible, appropriate, etc." 
Subjects responded by placing a check mark alongside the comparison they preferred in each pair. 
They then rated the similarity of the terms in both comparisons, first rating the similarity of the 
terms for the order they preferred, and then for the other, nonpreferred, order. A six-point scale 
(1 = Not Similar to 6 = Very Similar) was provided beside each comparison, and subjects circled the 
number on the scale that best corresponded to their judgment. 
In the Classification task, subjects also indicated which of the two comparisons in each pair 
they preferred. They then classified their preferred comparison as a "Regular" comparison (Literal), 
a "Figurative'7 comparison (Simile), or a "Nonsensical" comparison (Anomaly). Subjects were 
advised that a regular comparison is one in which the two things being compared are "really alike." 
They were also told that a comparison in which the two things being compared are not really alike, 
but which still makes sense, is a figurative comparison, and that a comparison that "makes little if 
any sense" is a nonsensical comparison. Subjects indicated their responses by writing the letter R, F, 
or N alongside each of their preferred comparisons. 
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Subjects worked through the tasks at their own pace. The average time required to complete 
the study was about 35 minutes. 
Results and Discussion 
In the analyses for this and the other studies min F' (Clark, 1973) was computed whenever a 
significant finding in either the Sub jects or the Items analysis was obtained. For the sake of brevity, 
only significant rrdn F''s are reported. In all the studies, an attempt was made to assign an equal 
number of sub jects to each experimental condition. In those cases where the number of subjects was 
unequal, the approximate method of unweighted means was employed (Winer, 1962). In addition, 
although in many cases the analyses of variance reported employed proportions, inspection of the 
distributions of the dependent measures indicated that there was no need to use normalizing 
transformations. 
Preference data. In order to obtain a scoring criterion for the preference data, an expected 
preference for each comparison pair was pre-experimentally determined by agreement amongst the 
authors. In the first analysis, the proportion of matching preferences from the Similarity Rating 
task was used as the dependent variable. A subject's order preference was scored as a "match" if it 
was the same as the expected preference. An analysis of variance was performed in which the 
factors were Task Order (Similarity Rating before or after Classification), List (Random Order 1 or 
2), Comparison Position ("a is like b" before or after "b is like a"), and Comparison Type (Literal, 
Simile, or Anomaly). A significant main effect for Comparison Type was obtained, min FX2, 72) = 
7.85 (for this, and all subsequent analyses, an a level of 0.05 was used as the criterion for 
significance). The mean proportion of matches (where .50 is assumed to indicate indifference) was 
higher for Similes (.86) than for Literals (.66) or Anomalies (.68). 
In a second analysis, the proportion of matching order preferences from the Classification task 
was used as the dependent variable. The factors used in the analysis were the same as those used in 
the first analysis. A significant main effect for Comparison Type was again obtained, min FX2, 66) = 
8.55. The mean proportion of matches was higher for Similes (.83) than for Literals (.67) or 
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Anomalies (.62). This pattern was virtually the same as that found using the matches from the 
Similarity Rating task as the dependent variable. 
Taken together, the results of these analyses demonstrate that the order of the terms in Similes 
tends to be much more constrained than in Literals and Anomalies. The judgments upon which 
these findings are based were judgments about which of the two orders of a series of comparisons 
was more "appropriate, reasonable, sensible, etc." These judgments pertain to the meanings of the 
statements. The results suggest that all three types of comparisons are semantically asymmetrical to 
some degree, but this asymmetry is particularly noticeable in Similes. 
Classification data. The next analysis was performed in order to measure the degree of 
correspondence between subjects' classifications, and the pre-experimental classifications of the items 
as Literals, Similes, or Anomalies. Classification judgments were scored as "correct" if they 
corresponded with the pre-experimental classification. The same factors were used as in the previous 
analyses. 
The mean proportion of correct classifications was relatively high for each Comparison Type: 
Literals (.79), Similes (.82), Anomalies (.75), and there was no significant main effect for this factor 
(min F' < 1). Although it is difficult to suggest an absolute criterion for what would constitute 
adequate correspondence, the absence of a main effect for Comparison Type suggests that the pre-
experimental classifications were not seriously biased with regard to Comparison Type. 
Similarity data. In the first analysis, the similarity rating assigned to the preferred order (as 
determined by each subject), sirti^ was used as the dependent variable. The factors used in the 
analysis were the same as those used in the previous analyses. A significant main effect for 
Comparison Type was found, min FX2, 79) = 90.19. For Literals, the mean sim^ was 4.89 (out of a 
possible 6.00, where 6 = very similar), for Similes it was 4.58, and for Anomalies it was 2.22. 
Scheffe' tests using the error terms from both the subjects and items analyses indicated that the 
mean sim for Similes and for Literals were significantly higher than that for Anomalies, but not 
significantly different from each other. These findings support the prediction of the imbalance 
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model that similarity ratings for Similes are generally more comparable to those for Literals than to 
those for Anomalies. 
The asymmetry hypothesis predicts that the reduction in the perceived similarity of reversed 
terms will be larger for Similes than for Literals and Anomalies. An analysis testing this prediction 
was performed by using as the dependent variable the difference score, (sim - simn^)y based on each 
subject's ratings for each comparison pair. The same factors were used as in the previous analysis. A 
significant main effect for Comparison Type was obtained, rrdn FX2, 135)= 32.07. For Anomalies 
the mean reduction in perceived similarity was .64, for the Literals it was .72, and for the Similes it 
was 1.61. Scheffe' tests using the error terms from both the subjects and items analyses indicated 
that the reduction for Similes was significantly greater than that for Literals and for Anomalies. 
These findings confirm the asymmetry hypothesis, both with respect to perceived similarity 
and with respect to meaningfulness. The data show that while all three types of similarity 
statement received reduced similarity ratings when their terms were reversed, the reduction for 
Similes was substantially larger than for Literals and Anomalies. The data also show that subjects 
found reversed Similes to be much less acceptable as "reasonable, sensible, and appropriate" 
statements than reversed Literals. The strong preference for the preferred order of Similes provides 
some evidence of the relatively high degree of semantic asymmetry of Similes. 
Another important aspect of the data is the finding that the perceived similarity of the terms 
in the preferred order for Similes was almost the same as that for Literals. This is inconsistent with 
the predictions of the contrast model. As indicated in the context of our earlier discussion of 
Equations ( l ) and (2) the contrast model predicts lower similarity ratings for Similes than for 
Literals. One slightly surprising aspect of the data was the finding of a difference in the post hoc 
tests between the similarity ratings for the nonpreferred orders of Similes and Anomalies. It had 
been expected that reversed Similes would look very much like Anomalies. There are at least two 
reasonable explanations of why the ratings for reversed Similes were higher than was anticipated. 
One is that some of the Similes may have been interpretable in both directions, either because they 
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were not very metaphorical (e.g., an artery is like a river seems less metaphorical and less 
asymmetrical than a tyrant is like a bulldozer}, or because a different meaning might be discernible 
from the reversed form (e.g., a zoo is like a school). The second possibility is that although 
comparisons were presented in pairs so as to dissuade spontaneous reversal, the presence of the more 
acceptable order may have primed the meaning thus rendering the reversed order more meaningful 
than it might otherwise have seemed. However, whatever the correct explanation is, it should be 
pointed out that if the mean ratings for the nonpreferred order of Similes (2.97) is compared with 
the mean values of the preferred order of Literals (4.89) and Anomalies (2.22), the reversed Similes 
do look more like Anomalies. 
The present study highlights several phenomena that need to be explained by a theory of 
similarity comprehensive enough to deal with both literal and metaphorical comparisons. Since 
these phenomena are predicted by the imbalance model, it now becomes necessary to determine 
whether or not the salience of the shared attributes for the ¿-term and the a-term differ for Literals 
and for Similes in the manner predicted by the imbalance model, that is, whether or not the salience 
imbalance hypothesis is correct. 
Study 2 
Although the first experiment served its purpose, there were some problems with the items. 
First, for consistency, all the similarity statements from which the items were constructed used the 
singular form of the nouns regardless of whether or not that form was appropriate. This resulted in 
some rather peculiar items such as a mountain road is like a snake, which seems to read better in the 
plural. Second, it became apparent that some of the Similes employed in Study 1 were either not 
very metaphorical and/or not widely understandable. For these reasons, Study 2 was designed to 
validate the materials to be used in the next two experiments. In this validation study, most of the 
Similes used plural rather than singular nouns except in cases where the singular clearly sounded 
better. Some of the Similes used in the earlier experiments were changed so as to improve them, and 
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for each comparison an abridged version of the shared attributes (henceforth called the grounds) 
was constructed. One of the main goals was to determine whether or not the grounds that we had 
constructed adequately captured the basic meaning of their corresponding comparisons. In addition, 
it provided an opportunity to measure the degree to which each statement was judged to be 
metaphorical. 
Method 
Subjects and Materials. Twelve undergraduates participated in partial fulfillment of a 
requirement for an introductory psychology course. 
One hundred and twenty comparisons of the form "a(s) is/are like bisT were used as stimuli. 
Sixty of these comparisons were considered to be Similes, and 60 were considered to be Literals. The 
Literals were formed by replacing a term in the 60 Similes with another term that was literally 
related. Half of the Literals were formed by replacing an cz-term and half were formed by 
replacing a ¿-term. This being the case, the order of the terms in Literals did not always correspond 
to an expected preferred order. These comparisons appear in Appendix B. 
A brief statement of the grounds was prepared for each comparison (see Appendix B). For 
both the Similes and the Literals, an attempt was made to construct the best possible grounds for 48 
of the 60 comparisons. For the remaining comparisons (the control Literals and Similes), an attempt 
was made to construct grounds that failed to capture the basic meaning, but which still were 
applicable to the terms. The control comparisons were included to encourage full scale usage. Two 
randomized lists of 60 comparisons each were constructed. The comparisons were divided between 
the lists in such a way that if a given Simile appeared in List 1, the Literal derived from it appeared 
in List 2. This insured that there would be no repetition of terms in either list. 
Subjects were provided with a four-point response scale and were asked four questions about 
each comparison. The first question, the Agreement question, asked subjects to rate the extent to 
which they agreed with the comparison (l = Strongly Disagree to 4 = Strongly Agree). The 
Agreement question was included mainly to distinguish agreement from adequacy of the grounds. 
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The second question, the Metaphoricity question, asked subjects to rate the extent to which they 
thought the comparison was metaphorical (1 = Not At All to 4 = Very Much). The third question, 
the Adequacy of Grounds question, asked subjects to evaluate how adequately the grounds presented 
along with the comparison captured its basic meaning (1 = Captures the Meaning Very Inadequately 
to 4 = Captures the Meaning Very Adequately). The subjects were instructed to make their 
evaluation of adequacy without regard to whether or not they agreed with the comparison. Finally, 
and less important, subjects were given a Correspondence question which asked them to rate the 
extent to which the grounds corresponded to the explanation of the meaning of the comparison that 
they themselves would have provided. 
Procedure. Before beginning the study, subjects wTere presented writh the comparison arteries 
are like rivers. Each of the four questions for this example was accompanied by a parenthetical 
statement to clarify the task. Subjects then received a booklet containing either the comparisons 
from List 1 or those from List 2. They were instructed to work through the booklet at a steady 
pace, and to respond to items in the order in which they appeared in the booklet. After completing 
that booklet, subjects received a second booklet containing the items from the other List. The order 
in which subjects received the two booklets wTas counterbalanced. The average time needed to 
complete the entire study was about 45 minutes. 
Results and Discussion 
The mean ratings and standard deviations for the four questions appear in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Since our primary concern was that the individual items had the appropriate characteristics for 
inclusion in the next study, these aggregate data are provided merely to show the trends for each 
question. Overall, subjects agreed with Literals more strongly than they did with Similes. Because 
Similes tend to reflect opinions (e.g., salesmen are like bulldozers) rather than facts (e.g., steamrollers 
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are like bulldozers), this finding is understandable. However, on balance, the agreement ratings for 
the Similes were on the agreement side of the agree/disagree midpoint of 2.5. As expected, Similes 
received higher metaphoncity ratings than Literals, with the two types having non-overlapping 
distributions. The Adequacy of Grounds ratings indicated that the grounds did capture the basic 
meaning of each comparison. Moreover, high ratings on the Correspondence question suggested that 
the subjects believed that they could not have done much better in constructing the grounds 
themselves. Inspection of the ratings for individual items indicated that the variance was low 
enough to enable the adoption of reasonable criteria of adequacy and metaphoricity for the inclusion 
of items in the next experiment. 
Study 3 
The purpose of this study was to test the salience imbalance hypothesis by using three 
different but related measures that were intended to converge upon salience. These measures were 
assumed to share substantial common variance, but each was also assumed to have unique variance. 
In an earlier pilot experiment, an attempt had been made to test for salience imbalance using the 
single measure of importance. It was clear from the data that subjects did not have a uniform 
criterion for judging the importance of an attribute with respect to some object. A question such as 
"How important is inducing drowsiness for lectures?" appears to be difficult to answer because it 
seems to lead subjects to respond "Important with respect to what?". As a precaution against a 
similar problem arising with a direct inquiry about salience, three relatively specific measures were 
employed in the present experiment. 
To the extent that an attribute is salient with respect to a concept (at least when the concept 
under consideration is a general term), that attribute can be expected to apply to all or virtually all 
instances of the concept. However, although salient attributes of a concept apply to most of its 
instances, it is not the case that all widely applicable attributes are highly salient. For example, the 
attribute has a windshield applies to all (or virtually all) cases of automobiles but does not seem to 
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be a very salient property of them. Thus the applicability measure is a reasonable, but imperfect, 
measure of salience. Another measure of salience, with a different set of imperfections, can be 
achieved by using judgments of the conceptual centrality of an attribute. The attribute induces 
drowsiness, for example, can be viewed as conceptually central to sleeping pills. Thus, conceptual 
centrality was used as a second measure of salience. Attributes that are conceptually central to an 
entity, however, do not necessarily exhaust the attributes that are salient. Some attributes might be 
very typical or characteristic and yet not be conceptually central. For example, the attribute being 
hairy is very characteristic of gorillas, but this attribute does not seem to be conceptually central. A 
shaven gorilla is no less a gorilla for that! Few people would deny, however, that being hairy is a 
salient attribute of gorillas. Characteristicness was used as a third measure in this attempt to 
converge on salience. 
Method 
Subjects and Materials. Fifty-three undergraduates participated in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for an introductory psychology course. 
The first step in preparing materials was the selection of 40 Similes and their corresponding 
grounds on the basis of the information obtained from the previous study. Of the 48 Similes writh 
adequate grounds, the 40 items selected all had ratings on the Metaphoricity question of 2.50 or 
higher, and their corresponding grounds had Adequacy ratings of 3.00 or better. The 40 Literals 
originally constructed from those 40 Similes, along with their corresponding grounds, were also 
selected. All of these Literals had ratings on the Metaphoricity question of less than 2.00, and their 
corresponding grounds had Adequacy ratings of 3.00 or better. In order to encourage full scale 
usage, the 12 control Similes and their 12 associated control Literals, all having inadequate grounds, 
were also included, resulting in a total of 104 items. 
The stimuli for the study were constructed by isolating the constituent a-terms and ¿-terms 
from each Simile and Literal. These terms were then paired with the corresponding grounds, 
resulting in 208 stimuli. The verb of each of the grounds was modified (e.g., from induce 
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drowsiness to inducing drowsiness). Two lists of 104 stimuli each were constructed. In each list, 
the grounds for a particular item were used twice—once in conjunction with the o-term, and once in 
conjunction with the ¿-term. Half of the items in each list were constructed using Similes, and half 
using Literals. If a particular Simile was used in List 1, its associated Literal was used in List 2, and 
vice versa. This was done to prevent the repetition of individual terms in each of the lists. 
Procedure. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three groups. Within each group, half 
of the subjects received List 1, and half received List 2. In one group subjects were asked the 
Applicability question. For example, they might be asked: "Being ugly and growing uncontrollably 
is believed to apply to slums in: 1 = Almost No Instances, 2 = Some Instances, 3 = Most Instances, 
or 4 = Virtually All Instances." In the second group, subjects were asked the Centrality question, an 
example of which was "How central to the concept of tumors is being ugly and growing 
uncontrollably? 1 = Not At All to 4 = Very Much." In the third group, subjects were asked the 
Characteristicness Question. For example, they might have been asked "How characteristic of 
illiteracy is inhibiting freedom and restricting opportunity? 1 = Not At All to 4 = Very Much." 
After completing their task, subjects in all three groups were provided with another booklet 
containing 52 comparisons that were reassembled from the terms they had just encountered. Each 
comparison was presented along with its reversed order (as in Study l), and the order of 
presentation was counterbalanced so that the original comparison appeared first for half of the pairs, 
and second for the other half. Within each of the three groups, half of the subjects received the 
pairs prefaced by the phrase "With respect to (grounds)", and half received the pairs only. This 
manipulation was included because it was considered possible that the reversal of the terms in a 
Simile might lead subjects to try to interpret the comparison using completely different grounds. 
For example, a Simile such as surgeons are like butchers would presumably be interpreted using 
grounds dealing with lack of finesse, whereas its reversed form, butchers are like surgeons, would 
presumably be interpreted using grounds dealing with manual dexterity at dissection. Subjects were 
instructed to read both orders of each comparison, and to indicate which of the two they felt was 
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more "reasonable, sensible, appropriate, etc." They were also asked to indicate whether or not the 
comparison they preferred was "meaningful" or "not meaningful", and to then do the same for the 
other, nonpreferred comparison. Throughout the experiment, subjects worked at their own pace. 
Results and Discussion 
Rating data. The ratings from each of the measures were averaged across subjects and used as 
the dependent variable in an analysis of variance in which the factors were Source of Item (Literal 
or Simile), Question (Applicability, Characteristicness, or Centrality), Term (a-term or ¿-term), and 
List (List 1 or List 2). A significant main effect was obtained for Source of Item, min 
FX 1, 105) = 43.13. Across all questions, the mean rating for terms from for Literals (3.26 out of a 
possible 4.00) was higher than that for terms from Similes (2.74). Also, a significant main effect for 
Term was obtained, min FX 1, 88) = 8.12. More important, the Source of Item by Term interaction 
was significant, min F'(l, 101) = 13.56. This interaction, in which the ratings of a-terms relative to 
¿-terms was lower for Similes than for Literals, is predicted by the salience imbalance hypothesis. 
The main effect for Question was also significant, min FX2, 65) = 3.97. The overall ratings were 
highest for Characteristicness (3.16), next highest for Applicability (2.95), and lowest for Centrality 
(2.89). However, the Question factor did not enter into significant interactions with any of the other 
variables. 
The main prediction of the salience imbalance hypothesis is clearly confirmed by these 
findings. The salience of the grounds, using the three measures individually and using a composite 
of the three, was higher for the ¿-terms of Similes than for their a-terms. Since the Literals were 
not constructed in a preferred order, it was necessary to utilize subjects' preference data in order to 
investigate salience imbalance in literal comparisons. 
Preference data. The first step in analyzing the preference data was to determine the 
proportion of subjects selecting the a/b order as their preferred order for both Similes and Literals. 
It was found that for Similes this proportion was .85 when the grounds were not present, and .81 
wrhen they were, again showing, as in Study 1, that Similes are not readily reversible. The 
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equivalent proportions for the Literals was .54 in both cases. This proximity to indifference was 
expected because, as mentioned in the Method Section of Study 3, the way in which the materials 
were constructed resulted in a more or less random assignment of terms to the a and ¿ positions. 
It is already clear from this Study, as well as from Study 1, that Similes exhibit a high degree 
of both asymmetry and salience imbalance. The next analysis was undertaken to determine 
whether this relationship also occurred for Literals. To this end, a Pearson correlation was computed 
between a measure of asymmetry and a measure of imbalance. The proportion of subjects selecting 
one order of a comparison in preference to the other was taken as the measure of asymmetry, and 
the difference between the means of the salience-related ratings for the ¿-terms and for the a-terms 
was taken as the measure of salience imbalance. When no grounds were presented, a significant 
relationship was found between the two measures, r = .39, df = 38. When the salience imbalance 
measure was positive, subjects showed a preference for the a/b order. When the salience imbalance 
measure was negative, they showed a preference for the b/a order. For example, subjects rated the 
grounds wearing uniforms and being members of the armed forces as being much more salient 
with respect to soldiers than with respect to sailors, and they also strongly preferred sailors are like 
soldiers (a/b) to soldiers are like sailors (b/a). Examination of the scatter plot indicated the 
existence of a few highly discrepant items. Inspection of the grounds for these items revealed 
plausible reasons for these discrepancies. For example, subjects strongly preferred switchblades are 
like daggers (a/b) over daggers are like switchblades (b/a). Unfortunately, the grounds being 
sharp weapons thai are easily concealed included the phrase easily concealed, which seems (in 
retrospect) more applicable to switchblades than to daggers. Thus, the complete grounds were rated 
as more salient for the a-term than for the ¿-term—the exact opposite of the pattern that was 
expected for items where the a/b order was preferred. 
A review of the grounds (see Appendix B) indicated that for seven items there seemed to be a 
bias in the phrasing of the grounds. Sometimes the grounds appeared to favor the a-term 
(intermissions/time-outs, switchblades/daggers, and steamrollers/bulldozers) and sometimes they 
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seemed to favor the ¿-term (visa/passport, farms' zoos, clouds/mist, and reform school/prison). 
When these items were deleted, the correlation between asymmetry and imbalance increased to 
r = .80, d f= 31. 
When the grounds were presented during the preference judgments, the strength of the 
relationship between imbalance and asymmetry in Literals was attenuated. For the complete set of 
items the correlation was not significant (r = .28, df = 38), but it was significant (r = .46, df= 31) 
when the seven items with biased grounds were excluded. Presumably, when the grounds are 
presented, subjects attempt to extract an interpretation from each of the two orders of the 
comparison and then select the one which yields the more sensible interpretation. Should these two 
interpretations be the same, the order that expresses this interpretation more appropriately will be 
selected. Insofar as the grounds are viewed as being a viable interpretation for both orders, only the 
latter consideration would enter into a preference judgment. Therefore, presentation of the grounds 
would be expected to reduce the degree to which one order is preferred over the other. 
The finding that when Literals do show imbalance, the direction of this imbalance tends to 
correspond to the order of the terms that is preferred (i.e., higher salience for the term that is 
preferred in the ¿-position) has important implications for theories of similarity in general because it 
suggests that salience imbalance contributes to asymmetry even in Literals. The contrast model 
accounts for such differences solely in terms of the weights a and /3, an explanation which the 
present data suggest may be incomplete. 
Meaning f ulness data. The last analysis was performed on the binary "meaningfulness" 
judgments that subjects made about both orders of the comparisons in the second part of the 
experiment. An analysis of variance was performed using as the dependent variable the proportion 
of subjects assigning a "Meaningful" response to each comparison. The factors wrere Comparison 
Type (Simile or Literal), Term Order ("a is like ¿" or "b is like a"), and Grounds Presentation 
(Present or Absent). Because in this analysis Comparisons served as the replication factor, standard 
F-values were derived. A main effect for Ground Presentation was obtained, F( 1, 78) = 6.2. When 
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the grounds were presented, the proportion of comparisons classified as meaningful was .73, and 
when they were not, the proportion was .69. This factor was not, however, involved in any 
significant interactions. Main effects for Comparison Type, K l , 78) = 43.88, and Term Order, 
F ( l , 78) = 142.70, were also significant. But the significant interaction of these two factors, 
F ( l , 78) = 131.22, was of greatest interest. Although the mean proportions of meaningful responses 
for the a/b Literals (.80) and for the b/a Literals (.79) were virtually identical, there was a large 
difference between the proportions for the a/b Similes (.82) and for the b/a Similes (.44). This 
finding supports the earlier claim (see Study 1) that Similes are semantically asymmetrical, since 
their meaningfulness is not preserved by the reversal of the constituent terms. 
Study 4 
Although Study 3 lends strong support to the salience imbalance hypothesis, it does so by 
examining the salience of experimenter-provided grounds. But, as was evident from the analysis of 
salience imbalance in Literals, measures of salience appear to be very sensitive to the particular 
phrasing chosen for the grounds. If salience imbalance can be demonstrated wrhen subjects provide 
their own grounds then the (implicit) assumption that the experimenter-provided grounds 
correspond to those that make the similarity statements understandable to subjects would no longer 
have to be made. Pilot experiments, however, showed that subjects often find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to articulate the grounds of (especially metaphorical) comparisons. The purpose of the 
present experiment was to examine the salience imbalance hypothesis in a manner that would avoid 
experimenter specification of the grounds while still not requiring subjects to articulate the grounds. 
This compromise was achieved by requiring subjects to generate, not the grounds, but only the one 
attribute of each term that they thought most contributed to making the corresponding comparison 
understandable. This approach does not depend on the strong assumption that there must be an 
identity match between the shared attributes of the two entities, but rather upon the weaker 
assumption that such shared attributes as there are need only be highly similar to one another 
(Ortony, 1979a). 
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Method 
Subjects and Materials. Thirty-six undergraduates participated in partial fulfillment of a 
requirement for an introductory psychology course. 
Two sets of 16 comparisons were drawn from those used in the previous study. In each of the 
sets, eight were Similes and eight were Literals. The Literals selected were totally unrelated to the 
Similes (i.e., they contained none of the same terms). These materials appear in Appendix C. Within 
each set, the order of the comparisons was randomized, and either the a-term or the ¿-term was 
designated as the target term. 
Procedure. Subjects were run in groups ranging from two to eight persons, and they received 
either Set 1 or Set 2 of the materials. They were told that they would hear a series of comparisons, 
and that they should write each comparison onto one of the index cards provided. They were 
further instructed that either the first or the second term of the comparison would be repeated, and 
that they should underline this (target) term. Half of the time the first term was the target term, 
and half of the time the second term was the target term. 
After each item was read, subjects determined which aspect (attribute) of the concept denoted 
by the target term contributed most to making the comparison understandable. As a measure of 
salience, subjects were then asked to rate the distinctiveness of the attribute on a five-point scale 
(1 = Not At All to 5 = Extremely). A distinctive attribute was characterized as an aspect of an 
object that is highly prominent (i.e., easily brought to mind), important (i.e., very central or 
characteristic), and discriminative (i.e., distinguishes the object from other objects). Two practice 
trials were conducted before the main part of the study commenced. Subjects were given 30 seconds 
to write down each attribute and to rate its distinctiveness. 
After subjects had been read all of the 16 comparisons in a set, they heard the entire set once 
again. On this second pass through the set, subjects again wrote down each comparison on an index 
card, but this time the other term in each comparison was designated as the target term. In this 
way, the attributes of both of the concepts involved in each comparison that contributed most to 
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making the comparison understandable were obtained from every subject. 
Having completed this phase of the experiment, subjects were asked to reread each comparison 
and both of the attributes that they had generated for it. They then rated the similarity in meaning 
of these two attributes using a five-point rating scale (l = Not At All to 5 = Extremely). These data 
were collected in order to determine whether there would be any systematic relationship between 
the degree of salience imbalance and the similarity of the attributes. Furthermore, it was felt that 
if the attributes were judged as being similar to one another, then it was more likely that both 
would be related to the same element in the intersection set. Subjects performed this task at their 
own pace, and wrote the rating on the back of each of the index cards. 
Results and Discussion 
Inspection of the data indicated that in virtually all cases subjects generated attributes that 
were relevant to the meaning of the comparison. In fact, compared with the other experimental 
tasks reported, this one seemed to facilitate comprehension of the comparisons to the greatest degree. 
Using the salience ratings as the dependent variable, an analysis of variance was performed in 
which the factors were Set (Set 1 or Set 2), Comparison Type (Simile or Literal), and Term (a-term 
or ¿-term). A significant main effect for Comparison Type was obtained, min F'(\y 456) = 10.22. 
The mean salience ratings for the attributes generated when the target terms were in Literals (4.15) 
was higher when the target terms were in Similes (3.66). More important, there was a significant 
Comparison Type by Term interaction, min F'(1, 60) = 5.24, as shown in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
Scheffe' tests indicated that the difference between the mean salience ratings for the attributes 
generated for the ¿-terms and a-terms in Similes (.29) was significant but that the difference for 
Literals (-.11) was not. Since the Literals employed in the present experiment were a subset of those 
employed in Study 3, we conclude that the reverse imbalance trend occurred for the same reason. In 
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any event, the finding of a significant difference in the predicted direction for the Similes again 
supports the salience imbalance hypothesis. 
Analyses of the ratings of the "similarity in meaning" of the attributes for both terms did not 
yield any significant difference. In particular, there was no evidence of any relationship between 
the rated similarity of meaning of the attributes of the cz-terms and ¿-terms and the asymmetry of 
the corresponding comparison. However, it is interesting to note that the mean similarity rating 
assigned to the attributes in Literals (3.77) was virtually the same as that of the attributes in 
Similes (3.73) and that both were relatively high. The comparability of these ratings, together with 
their relatively high level, lends credence to the supposition that the attributes in both Similes and 
Literals were indeed components of the grounds. In other words, they were shared attributes in the 
sense that they were similar to one another. This implication serves to increase confidence in the 
conclusion that the present experiment constituted a satisfactory compromise between the pre-
experimental preparation of the grounds on the one hand, and the requirement that subjects generate 
the grounds on the other. 
General Discussion 
Two main hypotheses were tested and confirmed by the experiments we have reported. The 
first was the asymmetry hypothesis which predicts that the terms in similes should show a greater 
asymmetry in judged similarity than the terms in other kinds of comparisons. The hypothesis also 
predicts that the meaning of similes will be more ailected by term reversal. With respect to judged 
similarity, the hypothesis was supported in Study 1 by the finding of a larger difference in the rated 
similarity of terms between the preferred and nonpreferred order of metaphorical comparisons than 
of literal and anomalous comparisons. The imbalance model predicts such a difference because it 
allows the measure of the intersection to be affected by the order of the terms, whereas the contrast 
model does not. With respect to meaningfulness, the asymmetry hypothesis was supported by 
findings in Studies 1 and 3 in which subjects showed stronger preferences for one of the two orders 
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of similes than they did for other kinds of comparisons. Again, the imbalance model accounts for 
this finding in terms of the effect of term order on the intersection set. In any comparison, salient 
attributes of the ¿»-term that are shared with the c-term are largely responsible for the meaning of 
the statement. In reversed similes there usuallv are no such attributes, so they tend to be perceived 
as having little or no meaning. This is not the case for the "correct" order of similes, or for either 
order of typical literal comparisons. 
The second main hypothesis, the salience imbalance hypothesis, predicts that the salience of the 
shared attributes in similes will be lower for a-terms than for 6-terms, but that a high degree of 
imbalance in this direction will not be a characteristic of other kinds of comparisons. This 
hypothesis was supported by the findings of Studies 3, and 4. In these studies, ¿-terms received 
higher ratings for shared attributes than a-terms, regardless of the salience-related measure 
employed. This finding also suggests that the salience independence assumption of the contrast 
model is untenable. 
The present findings bear on a number of corollary predictions of the imbalance model and the 
contrast model. In discussing equations ( l ) and (2) in the Introduction, it was argued that the 
contrast model predicts that the rated similarity of the terms of metaphorical comparisons should be 
lower than that typically found for literal similarity statements. This is because, for metaphorical 
comparisons, the measure of salience for the intersection set is likely to be relatively small compared 
to that for the distinctive sets, whereas for literal comparisons it is likely to be relatively large. In 
fact, however, Study 1 revealed no difference between the rated similarity of terms in metaphorical 
and literal comparisons. We believe that this result poses something of a problem for the contrast 
model. Unless one assumes that the salience of the matching attributes depends on the entity with 
which they are associated, and that in the case of similes the salience of these attributes is relatively 
high (deriving from the values for the ¿-term), there would seem to be no way of accounting either 
for the high similarity ratings accorded to metaphorical comparisons, or for the large reduction 
resulting from term reversal. On the other hand, the comparability of similarity ratings for the 
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terms in literal and metaphorical comparisons is compatible with the imbalance model. This is 
because the model permits the upper bound on the measure of salience of the intersection set to be 
increased, and thus is not committed to the prediction that the rated similarity of terms from similes 
will be lower than for those from literal comparisons. 
The finding in Study 1 that the reduction in similarity ratings for reversed metaphorical 
comparisons was to a level comparable to that for (the preferred order of) anomalous comparisons 
also provides compelling evidence in favor of the imbalance model. According to the imbalance 
model, except in the few cases in which a (different) meaning can be assigned to reversed similes, 
there are no high-salient attributes of ¿-terms in such comparisons that are part of the intersection 
set. Consequently, the measure f b (A Pi B ) is likely to be quite small, and in principle, could be 
comparable in size to that found for anomalous comparisons. In the contrast model, because the 
measure f {A fl B) is unaffected by the order of terms, there would appear to be no principled 
way in which to account for the low similarity ratings assigned to the terms from reversed similes, 
given the high ratings observed when the terms were presented in the preferred order. 
Other researchers investigating metaphor have obtained results that are compatible with those 
reported here. For example, Harwood and Verbrugge (1977) found that the perceived similarity 
tended to be lower, although not significantly so, when the terms from metaphorical comparisons 
were presented in the reversed order—a result consistent with our asymmetry hypothesis. Since, for 
any item, only one order of the terms was presented to a subject in their experiment, spontaneous 
reversal (cf. Study l) may have attenuated the difference between the reversed and non-reversed 
orders. The salience imbalance hypothesis was supported in a series of studies conducted by Hanson 
(1982). Hanson found that metaphorical comparisons tended to display greater salience imbalance 
than literal comparisons, although literal comparisons involving prototypes and variants also 
displayed moderate imbalance. Support for the imbalance model is also reported by Katz (1982), 
who specifically set out to test it. Using a variety of salience-related measures (dominance, 
typicality, fluency, and imaginal distinctiveness), Katz found that metaphorical statements having 
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shared features (attributes) that were low salient for the topic (a-term) and high salient for the 
vehicle (¿-term) were rated as better metaphors than statements that had the opposite pattern of 
imbalance (i.e., high-low). 
A general problem relating to the notion of salience is that it appears to suffer from the same 
lack of defining properties as do many other concepts (cf., Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith & Medin, 
1981). We have tried to characterize salience in terms of applicability, conceptual centrality, 
characteristicness, importance, prominence, and distinctiveness. Although the data resulting from 
these various characterizations seem to produce the same pattern of results, we suspect that these 
indices still fail to capture an important aspect of salience. All seem to relate to the degree to which 
a term represents a good example of something possessing the attributes. But it also seems plausible 
that some attributes are salient with respect to particular objects only because they are 
conventionally symbolized by those objects. For example, the attribute being proud is 
conventionally symbolized by peacocks, and is a salient property of peacocks not because it is 
conceptually central or characteristic, or even true, but rather by virtue of its conventional symbolic 
association ^ i t h peacocks. Perhaps one has to conclude that the most universal property of a salient 
attribute is that can be brought readily to mind, and that variables like characteristicness, 
conceptual centrality, and conventional symbolic value all contribute to the ease with which this 
occurs in the context of some particular word. This is an appealing notion since, ultimately, the 
point about salience is that more salient properties are presumed to be more readily "accessible" than 
less salient properties. 
A close relation between salience and accessibility is consistent with Barsalou's (1982) 
distinction between context independent and context dependent properties of concepts (see also 
Cohen's, 1979 distinction between semantical and practical features). According to Barsalou, 
context independent properties "form the core meanings of words," and are activated by the word in 
all contexts. Context dependent properties, on the other hand, are activated in only some contexts. 
Barsalou proposed that many metaphorical comparisons may involve properties that are context 
33 Similarity 
independent (and therefore highly salient) for the ¿>-term and context dependent (and therefore less 
salient) for the cr-term. Literal comparisons typically involve only context independent properties 
(which are highly salient for both terms). One interesting feature of this proposal lies in its 
identification of another perspective on the notion of salience, even though we have reservations 
about a categorical distinction between the two types of properties, partly because of the evidence 
from Study 3 that literal comparisons also exhibit salience imbalance. 
If salience is construed in terms of ease of "accessibility," and if the most salient attributes of a 
concept are accessed in all or virtually all contexts, then one would expect highly salient attributes 
to be activated even in cases where they are unnecessary, inappropriate, or even counter-productive 
with respect to the task at hand. This suggests, as Barsolou (1982) noted, that subjects might be 
unable to "block" the metaphorical potential of statements, even when they are instructed to 
interpret them literally, as Glucksberg, Gildea, and Bookin (1982) found. 
We believe that our results demonstrate that the imbalance model is sufficiently powerful to 
account for similarity data derived from metaphorical as well as literal comparisons. Furthermore, 
it predicts a (detected) source of asymmetry even in literal comparisons that is beyond the 
theoretical scope of the contrast model. However, both the imbalance model and the contrast model 
suffer from limitations. One of these is that both models are incomplete. As discussed in the 
introduction, the measure, / , employed in the imbalance model focuses on an attribute's salience, 
while Tversky's presentation of the contrast model focuses on relevance. Since both are pertinent 
aspects of an attribute, a comprehensive theory of similarity needs to incorporate them both. This 
would require elements of both the contrast model and the imbalance model. Assuming X. to be 
some shared attribute, and h to be a measure of salience, such a combined model would have to 
accommodate the fact that the salience of X. with respect to entity a, h(X, I a ), could be different 
from its salience relative to entity ¿>, h (A", I b). Therefore, the measure of salience of attribute, X-> 
in the context of some particular task would have to be a function of these two values, for example: 
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h (X, ) = wnh (X, \ a) + whh (X, I b ) (3) 
where wa + wb = 1. 
In directional similarity tasks, such as those addressed by the imbalance model, the weights are 
assumed to be w = 0 and w\ = 1. However, in nondirectional tasks it may be reasonable to assume a o 
that = w^. It would further have to be assumed that some other function, say g(X.), provided a 
measure of the relevance of X. in the context, and that the overall measure of the intersection (and 
of the distinctive sets for that matter) was obtained from some additive function over the products 
of g(X^I and hiX^j for all values of L In fact, it is interesting to note that one of the measures 
employed by Tversky (1977, p.338) appears to involve both salience and relevance. However, this 
measure of salience for the common attributes, is a product function, h (X,) = h (X; I a ) • h (X¡ I b ), 
as opposed to the additive function proposed in Equation 3. As an estimate of attribute salience 
relative to each specific entity, h(X, I a) and h(X, I b), Tversky used the proportion of subjects 
who indicated that the attribute was characteristic of the entity. Although this measure is an 
improvement over ignoring entity-specific salience (as he did in the immediately preceding estimate 
of / ) , it suggests that as the salience of X. for a decreases, so should the resulting similarity. Our 
proposed measure, on the other hand, does not suggest such a change in similarity. As a measure of 
relevance, Tversky's employed the proportion of entities in the domain that subjects indicated 
possessed the attribute, but for some inexplicable reason, only applied it to the measure of the 
common attributes. It would seem that a great deal of further theoretical and empirical work is 
needed in order to arrive at a satisfactory model that embodies both salience and relevance. 
Another limitation of both models lies in their emphasis on the contribution of the intersection 
set to judgments of similarity. By doing this, both seem to exclude the possibility that a similarity 
statement can ever convey information that is genuinely new in the sense of previously not being a 
part of the representation of the a-term. This is hardly reasonable. If a child hears an adult talking 
about tángelos and asks what they are, it seems implausible to suppose that the child would learn 
nothing by being told that tángelos are like oranges. 
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Now insofar as the models account for perceived similarity, this may not present a problem. 
The problem arises if one wishes to extend them to account for the processes involved in making 
similarity judgments. It would seem that the imbalance model might have an advantage over the 
contrast model in this respect. Additional assumptions can easily be incorporated to try to account 
for the comprehension process. One of these assumptions (discussed in Ortony, 1979a) is that for 
attributes to be considered as shared, they need only be highly similar (rather than identical), as was 
observed in Study 4. Another additional assumption that might be helpful in developing a process 
model would be to incorporate a salience criterion below which attributes associated with the ¿-term 
would not be considered for attempted application to the a-term, unless primed by the context (see 
Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983). This could reduce the need for extensive searching for applicable 
attributes, although such searching would still be possible if the criteria 1 level were lowered, as 
might happen when one attempts to make sense of a simile whose meaning is not immediately 
apparent. One might also have to postulate a lowering, or even the elimination of, the criterion in 
cases where genuinely new information was being acquired. In such cases it might be that there is an 
indiscriminate predication of all attributes that could conceivably be applied to the a-term. In any 
event, whatever modifications are made to handle processing, the model will have to account for the 
fact that people usually identify anomalous statements very quickly (Glucksberg et aU 1982). This 
fact alone suggests that under normal circumstances, extensive searching for applicable attributes of 
the ¿-term without regard to their salience is improbable. 
Whereas we have been concentrating on similarity there are other factors that contribute to 
understanding the nature of metaphors and metaphor comprehension. For example, Tourangeau and 
Sternberg (1981, 1982) provide a rather plausible account of metaphorical comprehension for some 
kinds of metaphorical statements (especially so-called genitive metaphors), but it is limited in its 
ability to account for the asymmetry phenomenon that was of interest in the studies reported here. 
Although Tourangeau and Sternberg (1982) are sympathetic to the salience model, believing that 
salience imbalance provides a "convincing" account of metaphorical asymmetry, other investigators, 
most notably Gentner (1980), have been more skeptical. In attempting to gather support for a 
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"structure-mapping" model (see Gentner, 1983), Gentner (1980) claims to have disconfirmed many 
of the main predictions of the imbalance model. In an experiment using eight metaphors, Gentner 
found that the interpretations of the statements (i.e., the grounds) were scored by judges as being 
predominantly "relational" rather than "attributional." She also found no salience difference of 
shared predicates for the two terms. Finally, she found no significant difference between forward 
and reversed metaphors with respect to either metaphoricity or aptness, although such differences as 
there were, were in the direction predicted by our asymmetry hypothesis. 
In our view, there are problems with Centner's study. First, her operational definition of 
salience in terms of order-of-mention of responses is, by her own admission, one that can be 
challenged—it confounds salience with ease of articulation. Thus, her failure to find salience 
imbalance may have been partly due to the fact that she did not have an adequate measure of 
salience in the first place. It may also have been due to the characteristics of the stimuli she used. 
All eight stimuli were selected from examples used in Ortony (1979a). Unfortunately, in many 
cases, they were examples designed to demonstrate potential problems and exceptions. For instance, 
some of Centner's items (e.g., encyclopedias are gold mines) were used as illustrations in Ortony 
(1979a) of statements whose metaphoricity might be primarily due to factors other than salience 
imbalance (e.g., domain incongruence). Finally, the absence of a significant difference between 
forward and reversed items on either the metaphoricity or the aptness measures may have resulted 
from the fact that the items were not presented to subjects in both orders. Just as the spontaneous 
reversal phenomenon can mask diff erences in perceived similarity, so also might it mask differences 
with other measures. In this case also, her method of selecting items may have had unfortunate 
consequences. For example, the stimulus surgeons are like butchers and its reversed form butchers 
are like surgeons, were included in Ortony (1979a) to illustrate that some reversed metaphorical 
comparisons are interpretable in both directions, but with different grounds. For such items, the 
apparent comparability of metaphoricity and aptness ratings could be based on different readings. 
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Given the support for the salience imbalance hypothesis in our own studies, and those of others 
(e.g., Barsalou, 19S2; Hanson, 1982: katz, 1982), we are inclined to believe that salience imbalance is 
a common characteristic of metaphorical comparisons. This conclusion seems more defensible than 
the denial of the hypothesis based on establishing the null hypothesis with a small number of 
subjects and with a small number of (nonrepresentative) items. As pointed out in Ortonv (1979a, p. 
167) "many statements of similarity depend on some structural isomorphism between the 
knowledge associated with the two concepts rather than on merely a match of simple attributes." 
Gentner seems to share this view, but apparently considers it incompatible with the imbalance 
model. 
Although we believe that salience imbalance properly defined is a major source of 
metaphoricity, it is surely not the only source. Nevertheless, while many unanswered questions 
remain, the present research does illuminate a number of issues that are of importance both to 
theories of similarity and of metaphor. The findings reported here suggest that the imbalance model 
is capable of accounting for the metaphoricity inherent in many similarity statements, as well as 
being able to provide a unified account of similarity judgments regardless of the kind of statements 
being judged. 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Literals and Similes on each Question 
Type of Question 
Item Type Agreement Metaphoricity Adequacy Correspondence 
Literals 3.21 1.58 3.37 3.22 
(.313) (.267) (.228) (.316) 
Similes 2.73 2.97 3.10 2.73 
(.423) (.345) (.348) (.517) 
Control Literals 3.26 1.43 2.01 1.77 
(.215) (.089) (.310) (.280) 
Control Similes 2.35 2.72 1.72 1.37 
(.485) (.417) (.407) (.301) 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for 
Literals and Similes on each Question 
Type of Term 
Item Type cz-term ¿>-term 
Literals 4.21 4.10 
Similes 3.52 3.81 
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Literals 
an anvil is like an anchor 
an art gallery is like a museum 
a scalpel is like a razor 
a visa is like a passport 
an anesthetic is like a sleeping pill 
a lamp is like a light 
a game reserve is like a zoo 
an oil well is like a gold mine 
an eel is like a snake 
a crab shell is like a tortoise shell 
a steamroller is like a bulldozer 
a hand grenade is like a time bomb 
an escalator is like a stairway 
a stream is like a river 
a scavenger is like a parasite 
an ant hill is like a beehive 
a landslide is like an earthquake 
a horseshoe is like a magnet 
Appendix A 
Anomalies 
a cigarette is like a school 
a mountain road is like a visa 
a scalpel is like a horseshoe 
a stream is like a hand grenade 
a game reserve is like a sermon 
an oil well is like a sleeping pill 
a steamroller is like a gold mine 
a razor is like an eel 
an art gallery is like a tortoise shell 
a visa is like a tranquilizer 
an iceberg is like a passport 
an anvil is like a beehive 
a polite manner is like an escalator 
an ant hill is like an earthquake 
a library is like a suburb 
a glacier is like an artery 
a tyrant is like a river 
a time bomb is like a smile 
Similes 
an education is like a stairway 
a political revolution is like an earthquake 
an artery is like a river 
a mountain road is like a snake 
a sermon is like a sleeping pill 
a library is like a gold mine 
a friend is like an anchor 
a cigarette is like a time bomb 
a mobile home is like a tortoise shell 
a family album is like a museum 
a book is like a light 
a sarcastic remark is like a razor 
a smile is like a magnet 
a university is like a beehive 
a suburb is like a parasite 
a tyrant is like a bulldozer 
a school is like a zoo 
a polite manner is like a passport 
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Appendix A 
Note: Mean metaphoricitv ratings appear in parentheses following each comparison and mean 
adequacy ratings follow each of the grounds. 
Similes and Grounds (List 1) 
illiteracy is like a prison (3.00) 
inhibiting freedom and restricting opportunity (3.16) 
schools are like zoos (2.91) 
being disorganized and noisy (2.83) 
cities are like beehives (3.25) 
being center of work and activity (3.42) 
slums are like tumors (2.91) 
being ugly and growing uncontrollably (3.00) 
desks are like junk yards (2.75) 
being disorganized and littered with things no longer wanted (2.83) 
soldiers are like pawns (3.25) 
being expendable and of relatively little value (2.75) 
children are like snowflakes (2.91) 
being pure and individually unique (3.00) 
reality is like a sledgehammer (3.08) 
delivering heavy and sudden blows (3.08) 
salesmen are like bulldozers (3.00) 
being relentless and undeterred by obstacles (3.50) 
drug pushers are like lepers (2.66) 
being dangerous and spurned by society (2.75) 
subway systems are like mazes (3.08) 
being structurally complicated and easy to get lost in (3.50) 
an education is like a ladder (3.41) 
being a means of reaching higher places (3.42) 
clouds are like cotton balls (3.25) 
being white and fluffy in appearance (3.42) 
a friend is like an anchor (3.08) 
providing stability during turbulent times (3.33) 
cats are like princesses (2.58) 
being fussy and expecting special treatment (2.75) 
insults are like razors (3.25 > 
cutting deeply and causing pain (3.58) 
family albums are like museums (3.08) 
containing records of the past (3.41) 
smiles are like magnets (3.17) 
attracting things in their vicinity (3.08) 
roads are like snakes (3.33) 
being twisted in appearance and unpredictable (3.08) 
rage is like a volcano (3.58) 
erupting unexpectedly and violently (3.75) 
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Literals and Grounds {List 1) 
lectures are like sermons (2.00) 
imparting information orally to groups of people (3.16) 
landslides are like earthquakes (1.33) 
being catastrophic events involving the landscape (3.58) 
moths are like butterflies (1.33) 
coming from cocoons and flying (3.58) 
switchblades are like daggers (1.66) 
being sharp weapons that are easily concealed (3.25) 
a mobile home is like a trailer (1.33) 
being lived in and movable to new locations (3.58) 
libraries are like archives (1.91) 
storing and preserving knowledge (3.58) 
ghouls are like vampires (1.58) 
being scary creatures featured in books and movies (3.50) 
obligations are like responsibilities (1.75) 
being moral commitments that should be honored (3.75) 
tire irons are like crow bars (1.50) 
being levers made of metal (3.08 ) 
hair is like fur (1.66) 
growing on skin and providing warmth (3.17) 
paste is like glue (1.50) 
being a sticky substance sold in bottles (3.08) 
faith is like belief (1.83) 
being a state of mind involving acceptance (3.00) 
idols are like gods (1.91) 
being revered by those who believe in them (3.33) 
cigarettes are like cigars (1.41) 
being cylindrical and made of tobacco (3.33) 
proverbs are like maxims (1.75) 
being wise sayings considered to be true (2.92) 
a visa is like a passport (1.41) 
being a document needed for foreign travel (3.50) 
shoppings centers are like markets (1.58) 
being places where goods are bought and sold (3.50) 
high rises are like skyscrapers (1.58) 
being tall buildings usually situated in cities (3.50) 
intermissions are like time-outs (2.00) 
being temporary breaks in entertainment (3.17) 
televisions are like radios (1.58) 
being electronic devices that present information (3.33) 
Control Similes with Inadequate Grounds (List 1) 
fog is like a coat (3.08) 
making mobility and running difficult (1.91) 
fugitives are like foxes (2.75) 
having teeth and ears (1.16) 
hallways are like telescopes (2.50) 
being nice to own and use (1.00) 
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perfume is like a tool (2.33) 
being purchased in specialized stores (1.83) 
stagecoaches are like dinosaurs (2.50) 
being discussed in books about the past (1.91) 
rumors are like viruses (3.50) 
seldom changing or going away by themselves (2.66) 
Control Literals and Inadequate Grounds (List 1) 
groves are like forests (1.41) 
being good places for picnics (2.16) 
jobs are like careers (1.41) 
being sources of pleasure and disappointment (2.16) 
rivers are like streams (1.50) 
having beginnings and ends (1.74) 
ponds are like lakes (1.58) 
containing living organisms and varying in temperature (2.41) 
roosters are like hens (1.41) 
having small bodies and legs (1.83) 
refrigerators are like iceboxes (1.33) 
being big and difficult to move (1.25) 
Similes and Grounds {List 2) 
lectures are like lullabies (2.66) 
inducing drowsiness and sleep (3.25) 
political revolutions are like earthquakes (2.91) 
involving upheaval and danger (3.00) 
dancers are like butterflies (3.83) 
being graceful and beautiful (3.50) 
lies are like daggers (3.25) 
being intended to wound and not used openly (2.83) 
a mobile home is like a turtle shell (3.00) 
being movable and just large enough for their inhabitants (3.00) 
libraries are like gold mines (3.58) 
being sources of wealth and worthy of exploration (3.25) 
debt collectors are like vampires (3.25 ) 
taking the necessities of like from unwilling victims (3.00) 
obligations are like shackles (3.08) 
restricting behavior and choice (3.16 ) 
questions are like crow bars (2.91) 
being used for prying out and extracting things (3.42) 
hair is like spaghetti (2.83) 
having tangled and flexible strands (3.33) 
trust is like glue (3.33) 
producing a strong and permanent bond (3.50) 
faith is like a beacon (2.50) 
providing direction and guidance (2.83) 
surgeons are like gods (2.75) 
being of unquestioned authority and having the power over life and death (2.75) 
48 Similarity 
cigarettes are like pacifiers (3.16) 
providing oral satisf action and soothing (3.41) 
proverbs are like spotlights (2.58) 
focusing on and illuminating things of importance (3.08) 
glamor is like a passport (2.83) 
facilitating access to desired places (3.33) 
shopping center are like jungles (3.50) 
being complex and difficult to find one's way around in (3.41) 
giraffes are like skyscrapers (3.16) 
being much taller than other things of their kind (2.92) 
vacations are like time-outs (2.50) 
being opportunities to rest and revitalize (3.58) 
busy-bodies are like radios (2.66) 
broadcasting information indiscriminately (3.16) 
Literals and Grounds (List 2) 
a reform school is like a prison (1.91) 
holding law-breakers in a secure environment (3.33) 
farms are like zoos (1.25) 
being places where animals are cared for (3.75) 
cities are like towns (1.33) 
being places with buildings inhabited by groups of people (3.00) 
slums are like ghettos (1.33) 
being run-down urban areas (3.50) 
garbage dumps are like junk yards (1.83) 
being places for disposing of unwanted objects (3.58) 
soldiers are like sailors (1.50) 
wearing uniforms and being members of the armed forces (3.42) 
raindrops are like snowflakes (1.33) 
being individual units of precipitation (3.50) 
a mallet is like a sledgehammer (1.25) 
having a strong handle and being used for driving stakes (3.66) 
steamrollers are like bulldozers (1.33) 
being heavy machines used for flattening the ground (3.58) 
drug pushers are like pimps (1.66) 
being involved in illegal business enterprises (3.08) 
subway systems are like railroad systems (1.16) 
being networks of routes for trains (3.75) 
a stairway is like a ladder (1.58 ) 
being used for ascending and descending (3.50) 
clouds are like mists (2.16) 
being masses of air saturated with water (3.25) 
a friend is like a relative (1.91) 
being a person relied upon in emergencies (2.83) 
princes are like princesses (1.33) 
being royality in line for the throne (3.50) 
scalpels are like razors (1.41) 
being very sharp and used in precise cutting (3.58) 
art galleries are like museums (1.66) 
being public buildings containing valuable artifacts (3.25) 
49 Similarity 
smiles are like grins (1.33) 
being signs of amusement and pleasure (3.41 ) 
roads are like paths (1.58) 
being land routes from one place to another (3.50) 
rage is like fury (1.50) 
being an emotion that is difficult to hide (3.08) 
Control Similes with Inadequate Grounds (List 2) 
beards are like forests (2.25) 
growing and being found all over the world (1.83) 
jobs are like jails (2.16) 
being places with people and equipment (1.83) 
rivers are like ribbons (2.75) 
being used and admired (1.33) 
ponds are like mirrors (2.91) 
having edges and flat surfaces (1.74) 
roosters are like clocks (3.41 ) 
having faces an moving parts (3.00) 
marriages are like iceboxes (2.50) 
losing their novelty quickly (1.66) 
Control Literals with Inadequate Grounds (List 2) 
a jacket is like a coat (1.25) 
being convenient and lasting for many years (1.75) 
wolves are like foxes (1.50) 
having legs and breathing (1.91) 
microscopes are like telescopes (1.50) 
being built and used by technicians (2.16) 
perfume is like cologne (1.33) 
being a liquid dispensed in bottles (2.25) 
stagecoaches are like wagons (1.41 ) 
being made of wood and metal (2.25) 
germs are like viruses (1.50) 
being small and found everywhere (2.24) 
50 Similarity 
Appendix A 
Similes (Sei 1) 
ballerinas are like butterflies 
slums are like tumors 
reality is like a sledgehammer 
an education is like a ladder 
a friend is like an anchor 
insults are like razors 
smiles are like magnets 
illiteracy is like a prison 
Similes ( Set 2) 
encyclopedias are like gold mines 
trust is like glue 
cities are like beehives 
rage is like a volcano 
obligations are like shackles 
sermons are like sleeping pills 
shopping centers are like jungles 
debt collectors are like vampires 
Literals (Set J) 
diplomas are like certificates 
streams are like rivers 
raindrops are like snowflakes 
cigarettes are like cigars 
garbage dumps are like junk yards 
sores are like warts 
landslides are like earthquakes 
steamrollers are like bulldozers 
Literals ( Set 2) 
stagecoaches are like wagons 
germs are like viruses 
ponds are like lakes 
faith is like belief 
beards are like moustaches 
televisions are like radios 
mobile homes are like trailers 
perfume is like cologne 
